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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the potential for monetary integ-
ration in the South Mediterranean area, in a context of both trade lib-
eralization and strong orientation of trade flows towards the EU. It uses
a gravity setting that includes both exchange rates volatility and relative
prices, as measures of de facto exchange-rate and monetary conditions,
to investigate trade integration for a large sample of countries. MENA
countries appears reactive to exchange-rate misalignments but not very
sensitive to exchange-rate volatility. Intra-MENA trade is not impacted
by real exchange rate changes. A stabilization of their currenies against
the Euro will not translate in much more trade but could be a good
strategy to stabiliza the prices of manufactured exports.
1 Introduction
The neighbors of the European Union (EU) display very contrasted fea-
tures. On the one hand, the New European Member States (NMS) -
where the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries are predomin-
ant - have been through a very deep and rapid integration with the EU,
market by deep trade integration, deepening financial integration, and
coming monetary integration.
On the other hand, the Southern frontier of the EU15 appears very
heterogeneous and fragmented, despite more than 10 years of preferen-
tial relationship (the Barcelona agreements). Trade is not as strongly
EU-oriented, trade and financial barriers are still high to some extent,
and despite the proximity of the Middle-East and North African (MENA)
countries to the European Union, there seems to be no sign of signific-
ant monetary integration within the Mediterranean basin. Indeed, and
for instance, Jordan is de facto pegged to the USD, Morocco and Tunisia
operate under managed float, Algeria operates a de jure free floating re-
gime, just as Egypt (which had a fixed peg to the dollar until 2003). As a
consequence, monetary regimes are very different and bilateral exchange
rates quite volatile.
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Moreover, pegging regimes can be quite unstable in MENA coun-
tries, as shown by the relative volatility of MENA countries currencies
against the USD and against the euro. While Turkey and Egypt, together
with Israel, tend to exhibit long-lasting lower volatility against the USD
than against the "euro", the same is not true for Morocco, Algeria and
Tunisia, who exhibit much more volatile apparent pegging, and a more
euro-oriented pegging in the case of Morocco.
Finally, as far as intra-MENA monetary integration is concerned, the
most striking feature is the high volatility of nominal exchange rates within
the area.1 Indeed, intra-MENA volatility is much larger on average than
the volatility of these countries’ currencies against the euro or the USD.
More than half of MENA trade takes place with the EU (especially for
Tunisia, Morocco and Algeria while Israel, Egypt and Turkey have more
diversified partners), and the EU is probably a a natural trade partner
for the countries of the region. The potential endogeneity of optimal
currency areas, pointed out by Frankel and Rose (1997), suggests that
trade and monetary integration deepen together. In this respect, the lack
of monetary integration within the area can be seen as an impediment
to further trade integration. Moreover, the lack of monetary stability in
the Euro-med area might also hinder further integration between MENA
countries.
1This feature obviously results from the diverging pegging choices made by the countries
of the region
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Table 1: Imports and exports of MENA countries by regions: 1980-2002
Share in imports (%) Share in exports (%)
AC Asia MENA OECD UE15 AC Asia MENA OECD UE15
1980 Algeria 1.8 1.0 0.6 13.2 70.8 0.9 0.1 0.0 51.1 42.3
2002 Algeria 1.6 5.7 5.3 14.0 64.4 0.5 1.9 7.3 19.5 62.3
1980 Israel 1.6 1.1 2.5 29.2 38.5 0.8 6.5 0.5 23.7 44.2
2002 Israel 1.2 9.1 2.6 22.1 47.1 1.3 13.5 1.3 44.4 26.0
1980 Morocco 1.7 2.2 0.2 9.1 57.6 4.5 2.8 1.9 4.6 65.3
2002 Morocco 1.5 5.8 3.3 7.3 60.4 1.6 6.2 1.7 10.3 70.4
1980 Tunisia 1.7 0.9 1.3 8.2 70.5 0.7 1.4 3.2 2.8 83.2
2002 Tunisia 1.0 3.4 3.1 3.7 75.8 1.2 1.7 2.8 1.8 78.9
1980 Turkey 5.4 0.8 1.1 7.7 35.6 6.8 1.5 1.6 6.0 42.9
2002 Turkey 4.6 8.1 3.4 9.1 48.9 5.3 3.0 5.3 10.3 51.4
1980 Egypt 2.3 3.4 0.3 30.1 50.4 2.9 2.2 3.7 10.9 63.3
2002 Egypt 2.3 11.7 3.2 23.5 35.1 0.8 9.3 3.4 19.9 40.7
Such worries about the future of regional integration within the Medi-
terranean area however need to rely on empirical analysis. More precisely,
they depend on the fact that trade flows indeed depend on the behavior
of monetary variables.
There is little debate about trade flows being determined by the beha-
vior of real exchange rates: appreciation in the real exchange rate leads to
a worsening of the competitive position of the economy, and consequently
to a rise in imports, and a fall in exports. This fact is now well docu-
mented, and is robust to the use of alternative measurement strategies
(macro-economic equations for exports and imports, gravity equations,
more micro-economic analysis), even if aggregate demand and supply
elasticities also depend on the structure of specialization in each coun-
try.2
The impact of exchange rate volatility on trade is more controversial,
both in theory and empirical analysis. In theory, an increase in exchange
rate volatility could either increase or decrease trade, depending on the
risk aversion of firms or on the shape of the production functions. Looking
at empirical analysis suggests that the measured effects of exchange-rate
volatility on trade can be either very low and little significant or signific-
antly negative, though minor in magnitude.
This paper is an attempt to evaluate the impact of exchange-rate be-
havior on trade. The main focus is on the MENA countries, but the
analysis draws on a larger sample, in order both to ensure the robustness
of the empirical results, and to test for potential asymmetries between
the MENA countries and the rest of the world. The analysis rests on
the estimation of a gravity equation for both exports and imports, for a
set of 47 countries, during the 1980s throughout to 2003. Therefore, the
analysis offers both a cross-sectional and time dimension, and is run using
panel data tools.
Section 2 presents the empirical model and the data. The estimates
2The impact of exchange-rate changes is even more important in small developing countries,
as their firms have little market power to implement pricing-to-market strategies - i.e. to
shelter their competitiveness from real exchange rate appreciation; and their markets are
usually not large enough to prevent importing firms to pass all exchange-rate changes through
onto prices. Therefore, any exchange rate change leads to changes in export and import
prices. For an empirical evidence with detailed results for developing countries, see Gaulier et
al. (2006).
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are displayed and analyzed in Section 3, and Section 4 provides some
tentative conclusions and possible developments for this analysis.
2 Empirical model and data
2.1 Deriving the desirability of an exchange-rate
regime from trade equations
The most popular analysis of the choice of an exchange-rate regime is
the theory of optimum currency areas (OCA thereafter). According to
this theory, first developed by Mundell (1961), the desirability of sharing
the same currency increases with bilateral openness and labor market
flexibility; the centralization of fiscal policy (also called fiscal federalism)
can be a substitute for these conditions. Following the seminal paper
by Mundell, a number of other criteria have been put forward, like the
degree of structural similarity, which affects ex-ante the probability that
countries experience asymmetric shocks (McKinnon, 1963; Kenen, 1969).
The construction of currency unions is a quite infrequent phenomenon.
Still, the OCA theory has been used not only to investigate the potential of
the EU12 to be an optimum currency area, but also to gauge the potential
anchoring strategies of countries, including emerging countries. This area
of studies was launched by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1996, 1997, 1998),
working on the optimal anchoring policy for Asian or EU countries, and
a number of work has followed, including Bénassy (1997), or Bénassy and
Lahrèche-Révil (1999, 2002), about the Central and Eastern European
(CEE) or the MENA countries. The issue in these studies is to explain
nominal exchange rate volatility by a number of macro-economic determ-
inants (such as the relative size of countries, their bilateral openness and
so on), in order to identify the potential anchor currency.
The main drawback of such an approach is that it ignores the potential
endogeneity of OCA, i.e. the fact that stabilizing the nominal exchange
rate between two countries creates the conditions for more trade, and
therefore more desirable exchange-rate anchoring ex-post than it was ex-
ante (Frankel and Rose, 1998). Therefore, the responsiveness of trade
flows to exchange rate changes is a major and prior issue for any further
investigation about the desirability of pegging or floating. This was the
intuition of Rose (1999), who renewed the literature on exchange-rate re-
gimes and trade. Looking at the impact of currency unions on trade, Rose
indeed showed that currency unions cannot be identified to zero-volatility
in exchange rates, but introduced more radical changes and could lead to
sizeable trade increases: according to its estimates, the increase in trade
could be 300% - a figure that could not be significantly lowered in further
research.
Turning to MENA countries, existing research (Benassy-Quéré and
al., 2002) founded on the OCA theory shows that these countries would
have an advantage if they pegged more to the euro than to the dollar.
This was shown to be true both for nominal and real pegging strategies
(i.e. focusing on competitiveness), although the MENA countries were
found to be highly heterogeneous, and the structure of the optimal pegging
basket did not suggest 100% anchoring to the euro. Given the existing
literature, one could expect that the heterogeneity in MENA currencies
de facto and de jure pegging strategies, because it leads to intra-MENA
exchange-rate volatility, is an impediment to real integration within the
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region. However, the recent experience of NMS, and the older one of
Asia countries, suggests that monetary and financial integration within
emerging areas does not necessarily stem from intra-regional integration,
but can be led by a common integration to a third region.
Asia is a well known example, where common pegs to the dollar have
led to real (through trade) and financial (through common pegs) integra-
tion. Asia also brightly showed that common and un-coordinated anchor-
ing could be fragile, because increasing integration makes un-coordinated
monetary policies unsustainable (Mundell’s holy trinity). The NMS of-
fer an alternative example, where common anchorage to the euro leads
regional integration, and is made more sustainable through the commit-
ment to enter the euro zone.
In this paper, the potential for further monetary integration within
the MENA area is investigated using the methodology developed by Rose.
More precisely, the sensitiveness of trade to exchange-rate regimes - defined
in a de facto way by the level and the volatility of the exchange rate -
is explored for a large sample, that includes the MENA countries. We
first gauge the situation of MENA countries with respect to other emer-
ging countries. We also characterize intra-MENA trade with respect to
MENA trade with other countries, and compare it with the situation in
other countries - especially NMS. Gains from anchoring are assumed to be
larger when the elasticity of trade to exchange rate volatility is higher, and
this assumption allows to investigate the potential gains of further intra-
regional integration, depending on whether this integration is limited to
the region or lead by increased integration with the euro area.
2.2 The empirical model
The impact of monetary integration on trade flows it investigated within
a gravity setting. The use of the gravitational equation is now well estab-
lished in trade issues, both for theoretical reasons (this equation is theor-
etically consistent with most existing theoretical models of international
trade) and empirical reasons (it has a very good and robust explanatory
power for trade flows). Moreover, it allows for a bilateral analysis, which is
of particular interest as the regional dimension of trade become a striking
feature of international trade flows.
The impact of real exchange-rate changes on trade is now being quite
well identified: a real appreciation usually has a deleterious impact on
exports through a demand effect (lower competitiveness) or a supply effect
(higher profitability of the traded goods sector compared to the non-traded
goods sector).
The link between exchange-rate volatility and trade flows is less clear.
According to McKenzie (1999), the elasticity of trade flows to exchange-
rate volatility can be either positive or negative, and the results depend on
the precise measure of volatility, on the estimation technique and on the
sectors and countries concerned. Moreover, the impact of exchange-rate
volatility might differ according to the countries under study: Sauer and
Bohara (2001) show that exchange-rate volatility has a negative impact
on African and Latin American exports, a non-significant impact on Asian
exports and on developed countries exports. The gravitational analysis of
trade flows has renewed the literature however. Frankel and Wei (1995,
1996) evidence a significant negative impact of exchange-rate volatility on
trade flows across Asian countries on a cross-section basis, a result found to
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be strongly robust by Rose (2000), who finds exchange-rate volatility to be
a significant and systematic impediment to trade for an extensive sample
of countries. Finally, Tenreyro (2006) finds opposite results. Following
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006), she uses a pseudo-maximum likelihood
(PML) technique to deal with heteroskedastic biases. To deal with the
endogeneity and the measurement error of exchange rate variability she
then develops an instrumental-variable (IV) version of the PML estimator.
Results indicate that nominal exchange rate variability has no significant
impact on trade flows.
The typical gravitational equation links trade (defined either as total
trade, imports or exports) to the product of country sizes, impediments
to trade, and a set of bilateral variables. In its theoretical expression, it










with α, β > 0, γ < 0 and η > 0.
where Xij stands for exports from country i to country j, Yi,j refers
to the economic size of country i (resp. j) - GDP is a usual proxy when
the sectoral dimension of production is not taken into account. Dij is the
distance between countries, δij is a dummy for common borders and Zij is
a vector of bilateral variables which frequently includes a dummy for the
use of a common language, and can also include exchange-rate variables,
as in Rose (2000).
While gravity models are often estimated on a cross-country basis,
panel data analysis is being more and more common (See Frankel, 1997,
or Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2003), as it allows for the inclusion of relevant,
time-varying variables, such as exchange rates.
This paper focuses on the impact of exchange-rate variables on trade
flows, and consequently does not seek to improve or refine the underlying
gravity framework. This is the reason why the baseline equation used in
this paper is a very standard one, including both the bilateral and time
dimensions, as follows:
lnXij = α1 lnGDPit + α2 lnGDPjt + α3 lnDISTij + α4 lnRERijt
+ α5V OLijt +GRAV ITYijt
+ βi + βj + βt + βregioni,j,ij + εijt (2)
The dependent variable is the volume of exports in constant dollars
(trade data from the CHELEM-CEPII database, price indexes from the
World bank and the IMF).
GDPi,jt is the PPP-converted GDP for either country i or j (in volume,
World Bank data). The gravitational variables are summarized in DISTij
and GRAV ITYijt. DISTij is the geodesic distance between i and j.
GRAV ITYijt is a vector of variables relating to gravitation, which in-
cludes variables such as dummies for common languages or borders, a
common colonizer, and so on. These data are taken from the CEPII’s
website.3 RERijt is the real exchange rate, computed using CPI and
defined as the relative price of j to i (an increase therefore signals a real
depreciation of the currency of country i).
3 See www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
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V OLijt is a measure of volatility. This measure is one of the less
obvious to build, as can be seen from the large number of volatility prox-
ies that are available for the exchange rate. First of all, a large part
of the financial literature highlights the fact that, as long as agents are
information-seeking, only the unexpected part of exchange-rate volatility
can have potential consequences on economic decisions. This is the reason
why this literature has developed econometric models of the exchange-rate
volatility (see e.g. ARCH models - and their various derivatives - for ex-
change rate series) aiming at extracting information from volatility series,
and therefore allowing build unexpected volatility series.
In the longer run, exchange-rate are often described as following a ran-
dom walk, and their standard deviation (or their coefficient of variation)
is often enough to describe their volatility. While this might be true for
nominal exchange rates, it is less relevant for real exchange rates, that
are driven by fundamentals. In order to correctly measure their volatil-
ity, de-meaning is usually necessary, and a better measure of volatility is
therefore the standard deviation of the rate of change of exchange-rate
series.
We chose to use this last definition of volatility, applying it alternat-
ively to monthly nominal and real exchange rates.4
The definition of exchange rate volatility is therefore the following:
V OL =
p
V ar(lnERijτ − lnERij,τ−1)τ=1→12 (3)
Where ERijτ is the exchange rate, either nominal or CPI-deflated, and
τ is monthly. Hence, we compute the volatility of the monthly exchange
rate for a given year.
The sample includes 47 countries, of which all the countries of the
EU15 and the CEE new European members, and 6 MENA countries (Mo-
rocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Turkey, Israel, Algeria). The time sample spans
from 1980 to 2003. Hence, the total possible number of observations is
49,726. Due to missing data, the available number of observations is re-
duced to 34,457. Because the data are pooled over the cross-country and
time dimension, the equation is estimated using the panel within estim-
ator, which implies the use of individual and time fixed effects. Here, the
fixed effects are included for country i, country j and time (βi, βj and
βt), the pure bilateral dimension ij being caught by the distance variable.
Additional fixed effects are also introduced to control for regional features
of the countries (summarized in vector βregioni,j,ij ). This vector includes
fixed effects for the region to which either the exporter or the importer
belong5 and bilateral regional fixed effects (i.e. a dummy for each pair of
region to which the exporter/importer belong).
Hence, βi is a vector of fixed effects for the exporting countries. βj is
a vector of fixed effects for the importing countries. βt is a vector of fixed
effects for time (yearly frequency). The βregioni,j,ij vector includes dum-
mies for the exporter’s and importer’s broad regional belonging (MENA,
Asia, NMS ...)
The main focus of this paper is to investigate whether exchange-rate
changes have an impact on trade flows in the MENA countries, in order to
4Notice that working on shorter-run data would call for the use of ARCH models. However,
ARCH effects are usually shown to be less prevalent in the longer run (from the quarter to
the year).
5 6 regions have been defined: new European member states, Asia, MENA countries, EU,
XXXXXXX
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have an insight on the potential for monetary integration, either within the
region, or at least with the main trading partner, i.e. the EU15/25. The
availability of a large sample of countries allows to investigate this issue
with more precision, as it also allows to measure the degree of symmetry
of the MENA country with respect to the rest of the world. This is the
reason why a step-by-step estimation strategy is implemented here. In a
first step, the trade equation is estimated on the whole sample of countries,
assuming that all the countries of the sample behave symmetrically as far
as the estimated elasticities are concerned, and only differ up to a constant
term, which includes regional effects. In further steps, the model accounts
for region-specific effects, in order to investigate potential asymmetries
between the countries of the sample.
3 Bilateral trade and the bilateral exchange
rate
In the following, the empirical analysis is systematically run over the whole
period (1980-2002), but also over shorter sub-periods. Indeed, the whole
period is quite long, and structural breaks might be present within it (due
for instance to the liberalization of capital flows during the 1990’s, which
was not only a feature of industrialized countries). Including fixed effects
for time controls for breaks in the constant term, but not in estimated
coefficients. However, it should be noted that shortening the time period
also reduces the number of degrees of freedom, as well as the variance of
variables. This turns out to have the effect of reducing the significance of
most exchange rate variables, as can be seen in the following.
3.1 Panel estimates on the whole sample
In the following, we display a number of estimates run on the whole
sample, both on (the log of) exports and imports.6
The results are very close to what is usually obtained in similar em-
pirical analysis. First of all, gravitational variables are highly significant
and bear the expected sign, a result that further confirms the strong ex-
planatory power of gravitational modeling for trade flows. The estimated
coefficient for GDP are close to 1, which is the expected order of mag-
nitude, and the distance coefficient is also very close to minus 1.
Other gravity variables are also highly significant, mostly pointing to
geographical and historical proximity leading to more exports. The only
exception is with contiguity, which unexpectedly bears a negative sign.
However, this variable is potentially collinear to the adjacency variable
(close countries have a higher probability to share the same language),
which could explain the sign of the estimate.
Turning to exchange-rate variables, the real exchange rate has the
expected positive sign, meaning that a 10% depreciation leads to a 5%
increase in bilateral exports. This is a rather sensible price-elasticity es-
timate (working on the G7 countries, and relying on time-series econo-
metrics, Hooper et al., 1998, find the long-run price-elasticity of exports
to be ranging between .2 and 1.6).
The impact of exchange rate volatility however is less robust, and it
tends to vanish when the time period is reduced. The coefficient on the
6Estimates for fixed effects are not displayed but are available upon request.
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real exchange rate also tends to be less (it drops to approximately .4, from
almost .6). This might be an indication that the impact of exchange-rate
variables is lessened by the financial integration of economies, as hedging
can be made more easy. It can also be the consequence of diminish-
ing variance in the variables, as the 1990s where a period of reducing
exchange-rate volatility. Notice that the results in columns (5) and (6)
are much less easy to interpret, as the number of available observations
to estimate the impact of exchange-rate variables is very limited.
As far as the impact of exchange-rate volatility is concerned, columns
(1) to (4) suggest that the impact of real exchange rate volatility on
export is more significant and stronger than the impact of nominal
exchange-rate volatility, which is not unexpected, since it is easier to
hedge against nominal than against real exchange-rate risk.
On the import side, the results are roughly similar: gravity variables
bear a strong high explanatory power, and are signed as expected: the
GDP elasticity is around 1, and the distance coefficient is very close to
minus 1. Once again, contiguity fails to be significant and signed consist-
ently to usual expectations.
A depreciation of country i’s currency (increase in the real exchange
rate) leads to an increase in country j imports from i. In other words,
when j appreciates in real terms, imports increase, with an elasticity
around .2. This elasticity is lower than the available estimates for the
G7, and would suggest that the Lerner-Marshall and Robinson critical
values are not met on average for the countries of the sample (the sum
of price elasticities in absolute value is .5+.2=.7, which is lower than
1). Once again, this result keeps consistent with the empirical literature,
which often highlights the low level of price elasticities (see for instance
the elasticities pessimism, as reviewed in Obstfeld, 2002).
Consistently with the results obtained on exports, exchange-rate vari-
ables fail to significantly explain import flows on the most recent period,
a result which is stems from the limited number of observations in the
time dimension. Consistently also with previous results, the volatility of
the real exchange rate tends to impact imports more strongly and signi-
ficantly than the volatility of the nominal exchange rate. All in all, the
volatility of the exchange rate has a detrimental effect on imports , and
its size is comparable to the impact on exports (which is expected, since
the CHELEM trade data are harmonized, and Xij =Mji).
Table 3 about here
Summing-up the whole-sample estimates, it appears that exchange
rate volatility tends to be detrimental to trade, since both exports and im-
ports are adversely affected by an increase in volatility. This is especially
the case for real exchange rate volatility, and the results are somewhat
sensitive to time period under analysis.
Long-run changes in the real exchange rate have a more robust and
systematic impact on trade, suggesting that, in the whole sample of coun-
tries, changes in the level of the real exchange rate have more impact
than changes in its volatility. However, the sum of price elasticities is
lower than 1, suggesting that - at least over one year - the price effects
are not integrally balanced by volume effects. Hence the efficiency of the
real exchange rates as an adjustment tool is not guaranteed within the
sample.
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This first set of estimates builds on the hypothesis that trade reaction
to exchange rates is homogeneous across the sample. The next subsection
investigates the relevance of such a hypothesis, by allowing exchange-rate
elasticities to vary according to the regional belonging of the countries of
the sample.
3.2 Are theMENA countries behaving differently?
The previous set of estimates provides with a broad picture of the im-
pact of exchange-rate variables on trade, showing that both exchange-rate
volatility and changes in the level of the real exchange rate affect trade,
although with varying robustness. A question is however to determine
whether this is a general feature of all the countries of the sample, or
whether some country groupings behave differently.
In order to address this issue, regional dummies are built, correspond-
ing to the following groupings: EMU, EU15, OCDE, New European Mem-
ber States (NMS hereafter), Asian and MENA countries. These dummies
(either for exporters or importers) are then interacted with the exchange-
rate variables, in order to catch potential asymmetries in the reaction of
trade to exchange-rate regimes changes. In a first step, the behavior of
MENA countries is compared to that of all the remaining countries of
the sample. The estimated equations are the following, for exports and
imports respectively:
lnXijt = β + α1MENAi lnRERijt + α2(1−MENAi) lnRERijt
+ α3MENAiV OLijt + α4(1−MENAi)V OLijt
+ GRAV ITYijt + βi + βj + βt + βregioni,j,ij + εijt (4)
lnMijt = β + α1MENAj lnRERijt + α2(1−MENAj) lnRERijt
+ α3MENAjV OLijt + α4(1−MENAj)V OLijt
+ GRAV ITYijt + βi + βj + βt + βregioni,j,ij + εijt (5)
Where MENAi,j is the dummy variable associated to MENA coun-
tries (taking the value of 1 if country i or j - depending on whether
estimates are run on exports or imports - belongs to the corresponding
grouping). Therefore, the coefficient associated to the interaction of the
MENA dummy with exchange-rate data reflects the MENA-specific im-
pact of the real exchange rate (resp. the exchange rate volatility) on
trade, which can be directly compared to the same coefficient in the other
countries of the sample. Results are displayed in Tables 4 and 5.
As far as the MENA countries are compared to the rest of the sample,
the results show there is indeed some heterogeneity in terms of behavior
between the MENA countries and the rest of the sample. MENA exports
are much less elastic to real exchange-rate changes (the elasticity, when
significant, is half in MENA countries, and the difference between MENA
countries and the rest of the sample is statistically significant - CHECK) -
see Tables 4.
The impact of exchange-rate volatility is also quite heterogeneous, as
exchange-rate volatility negatively affects other countries exports, while
it has no impact or a positive impact for MENA countries (1980-2002 and
1992-2002 periods).
Turning to imports, MENA countries were much more sensitive to
exchange rate changes than other countries of the sample on the whole
10
period (1980-2002), but this conclusion is quite sensitive to the period
of analysis. Indeed, it is no more significant after 1992. Such a result
suggests a structural break within the whole sample, and would deserve
further analysis.
This result is obviously the outcome of the trade specialization of these
countries. The share of raw products (such as oil) is higher in their exports
than it is for other countries of the sample. As the prices of these products
are set on international markets - where market power has almost no im-
pact - and directly in international currencies, exports are rather inelastic
to changes in prices. On the import side, the situation is different, as the
price elasticity of MENA imports is slightly higher as the price elasticity
of other countries’ imports: MENA countries import more manufactured
goods, for which the price-elasticity of demand is higher. Whether this
reflects a composition (MENA countries import a higher share of price-
elastic goods than the other countries of the sample) or a structural effect
(the price elasticity of demand of MENA countries is higher, regardless of
the composition of imports) is an issue that cannot be further investigated
within the framework of this paper.
Table 4 about here
Going further, we investigate here the existence of asymmetries in
the behavior of MENA countries relative to other developing countries
of the sample. Therefore, 3 regional dummies are interacted with the
level and the volatility of the real exchange rate (the three regions being
the MENA countries, Asian countries and the European new member
states and acceding countries). The real exchange rate level and volatility
are also included in the analysis. They give an information about what
happens in the remaining countries of the sample (i.e. OECD developed
countries). The estimated equations are therefore the following:
lnXijt = β + α1MENAi lnRERijt + α2MENAiV OLijt
+ α3ASIAi lnRERijt + α4ASIAiV OLijt
+ α5ACi lnRERijt + α6ACiV OLijt
+ α7 lnRERijt + α8V OLijt +GRAV ITYijt
+ βi + βj + βt + βregioni,j,ij + εijt (6)
lnMijt = β + α1MENAj lnRERijt + α2MENAjV OLijt
+ α3ASIAj lnRERijt + α4ASIAjV OLijt
+ α5ACj lnRERijt + α6ACjV OLijt
+ α7 lnRERijt + α8V OLijt +GRAV ITYijt
+ βi + βj + βt + βregioni,j,ij + εijt (7)
Results are displayed in Table 6. Gravity variables estimates other
than for GDP and distance remain unchanged in terms of sign and signific-
ance. The coefficient on the real exchange rate describes the all-countries
sensitivity of trade to exchange rates, net from regional specificities. The
interaction of regional dummies with exchange rate variables identifies the
additional impact of belonging to a given region on the sensitiveness of
trade to exchange rate changes. For instance, the total impact of real
exchange rates on MENA exports is given by the sum of α1 and α6.
According to Table 6, heterogeneity can be sizeable in the sample.
Looking first at the real exchange rate, its “net” (of Asia, NMS and MENA
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countries specificities) impact on exports is positive and significant, as well
as quite large in absolute value (close to .6 over the whole time period).
But it is significantly lower in MENA countries (as well as in the NMS),
while Asia countries exhibit a higher price-elasticity of trade than the
other countries of the sample. Hence, the conclusion obtained previously
on MENA countries is confirmed.
As to exchange-rate volatility, it has a negative (though somehow fra-
gile) impact on exports.7 Most countries of the sample behave similarly,
as evidenced by the fact that region-specific dummies for Asia and the
NMS are not significantly different from zero. The MENA countries are
heterogeneous in this respect, as they tend to exhibit less sensitivity of
exports to nominal exchange-rate volatility (the coefficient on MENA ×
volatility is positive and significant, and is large enough to reverse the
sample-estimate of the impact of volatility on trade (−.6 + 1.4 = .8)
On the import side however (Table 7, the differences are quite mar-
ginal: the sensitivity of MENA, Asian and NMS countries to the real
exchange rate is quite similar. These results suggest once again that ex-
port specialization might play a dominant role in the behavior of the
trade balance with respect to the exchange rate (since the behavior of
imports is quite homogeneous across regions). On the whole, exchange-
rate variables tend to have a higher impact on Asian countries - especially
for exports, while the differences is probably not significant for imports
- which may be reflecting the Asian specialization manufactured goods
with higher price-elasticity.
Table 6 and 7 about here
3.3 Is intra-MENA trade specific?
In order to gauge the potential for monetary integration within the MENA
countries, the impact of exchange-rate features on intra-MENA trade
also deserves attention. To this aim, another set of dummies is included
into the regression, to identify the impact of intra-MENA exchange-rate
changes. Because the EU is the closest and largest neighbor of MENA
countries, the euro is the most obvious candidate for external anchoring
of the currency, as already shown by existing studies (Bénassy-Quéré et
al., 2002). A dummy is therefore also included, that identifies MENA/EU
trade flows. The definition of dummies is the following:
- MENAij takes the value of 1 when both trade partners are MENA
countries. Therefore, this dummy identifies intra-MENA trade.
- MENA/UEM takes the value of 1 when trade takes place between a
MENA country and a EU member. Therefore, this dummy identifies
EU trade with the MENA countries.
All dummies are interacted with exchange-rate variables, so that the
following equation is estimated both for imports and for exports:
7Here, only nominal exchange rate volatility is investigated, to make our results more
comparable to the existing literature, where the nominal exchange rate is mostly used to
measure volatility.
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lnXijt = β + α1 lnRERijt + α2MENAij lnRERijt
+ α3MENA/UEM lnRERijt + α4V OLijt
+ α5MENAijV OLijt + α6MENAiUEMjV OLijt
+ α7MENAjUEMiV OLijt +GRAV ITYijt
+ βi + βj + βt + βregioni,j,ij + εijt (8)
This equation identifies the impact of exchange-rate variables on intra-
MENA trade and, additionally, of trade between EU and MENA countries.
In order to obtain more evidence about the specificity of MENA imports
and exports with the EU, we also estimated the equation by substituting
MENA/UEM by:
- MENAiUEMj takes the value of 1 when i is a MENA country, and
j belongs to the EU. This dummy describes MENA imports from
the EU.
- MENAjUEMi takes the value of 1 when j is a MENA country, and
i belongs to the EU. This dummy describes MENA exports to the
UE.
Results are displayed in Tables 8 and 9.
Tables 8 and 9 about here
Compared to what is observed over the whole sample (real exchange
rate elasticity of exports around .6), intra-MENA seems to be little react-
ive to changes in the real exchange rate. The total impact of 10% a real
exchange rate change (say, a depreciation) is a 2% increase in intra-MENA
exports (0.6-0.4 * 10%).
However, this result can be further investigated (Column 2 of Table
8 for exports). MENA exports to the EMU are oddly affected by the
real exchange rate (−.4 + 1 > 0), probably reflecting the raw-materials
orientation of MENA exports. EMU exports towards MENA countries,
on the contrary, are similarly affected by a change in the exchange-rate
as other EMU exports.
Not controlling for other regional groupings, intra-MENA and EMU-
MENA trade is not behaving differently as far as volatility is concerned.
Similar results are obtained from imports.
Hence, while MENA trade on the whole seems to react to exchange
rate changes in an asymmetric way compared to other broad groups of
countries, there is nothing very much specific in intra-MENA trade sens-
itivity to the exchange rate - except the fact that MENA exports to the
EMU are not sensitive to exchange rates in the expected direction.
4 Summary of results and policy implic-
ations
The choice of an exchange rate regime, and eventually the move towards
greater monetary cooperation between countries is an important issue
for emerging countries, which are getting more and more open and seek
both growth and stability. The optimum currency area theory states that
countries should feel a greater incentive to peg to the same currency,
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the more bilaterally opened they are, and the smoother internal adjust-
ment to shocks is. However, recent developments in this area also state
that bilateral openness is endogenous to exchange rate developments, and
that a given exchange-rate strategy could eventually prove ex-post more
desirable than it could have been ex-ante. This conclusion is however
conditional to the structural patterns of trade. On the empirical side,
the gravity analysis has shown with continuous robustness that trade was
determined by very structural and slowly changing (if ever) determinants
as the size of the partner countries and distance - as an approximation
for trade costs. The potential for monetary integration should therefore
primarily be determined by a number of geographical determinants, and
in a second step by exchange-rate developments, as these also influence
trade flows.
The analysis developed above yields a number of conclusions, and some
insight for MENA countries. First of all, it confirms the powerfulness of
the gravity equation for explaining trade flows. It also confirms that
de facto exchange-rate regimes - defined by the level of and the volat-
ility of the (real) exchange rate - also contribute to the determination
of trade flows. All in all, once gravity determinants are controlled for,
exchange-rates have only limited impact on trade flows: the elasticity of
exports to the real exchange rate is found to be low (compared to standard
macro-economy results), around 0.5, as is the elasticity of imports (0,2).
Volatility has an negative impact on both kinds of flows, ranking between
-0.2 and -0.9 depending on the definition of this variable. Within this
framework, MENA countries do not behave as strong outliers: the elasti-
city for exports is lower than for the whole sample (while the elasticity
for imports is slightly larger), and the impact of volatility compares with
what is obtained for the whole sample. Moreover, they behave quite sim-
ilarly to European NMS and accession countries - in this respect, Asian
countries display a more asymmetric behaviour, with higher sensitivity
to exchange-rate volatility and standard price elasticities of trade. Com-
pared to the NMS, MENA countries display more volatility of intra-area
exchange rates, which is by sure an impediment to trade, and therefore
an obstacle for further monetary integration. However, some of them
also display high volatility against the most obvious candidate currency
for anchoring (namely, the euro and the dollar in the second place), and
the failure to coordinate monetary policies against the same international
anchor further depletes intra-MENA monetary stability.
What would be the best strategy for further increasing monetary in-
tegration within the region? An attempt was made in this paper to
identify the impact of de facto exchange-rate regime characteristics on
intra-MENA trade, compared to MENA trade with other countries. It
appears that intra-MENA trade is slightly more - but not significantly -
impacted by real exchange rate changes than MENA trade irrespective
of the partner.8 Therefore, increasing intra-MENA monetary integration
would probably not yield overwhelming gains in terms of trade, given that
intra-MENA trade integration is still very limited. Once proximity to the
EU and the size of EU is controlled, the estimates were not able to put
forwards any interesting impact of exchange rates on MENA/EU trade.
This could be interpreted as the fact that MENA/EU trade does not dif-
fer much from overall MENA trade in terms of sensitivity of the de facto
exchange-rate regime. But given the weight of the EU as a trade partner
8The elasticity of exports to the real exchange rate is 0.3 for whole MENA trade - 0.681-
0.414, while it is also 0.3 - 0.61-0.312 - for intra-MENA trade
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for most MENA countries, stabilizing the exchange rate and containing
real exchange rate shifts appears as a more important target as monetary
integration within the EU. Moreover, it could be the case that MENA
countries, by stabilizing their exchange rates against the euro, would by
the same time stabilize also intra-MENA currencies. Such a phenomenon
was actually grounding the process of intra-Asian integration before and
after the Asian crisis of 1997. As far as competitiveness vis-à-vis the rest
of the world is concerned, the analysis confirms that the countries of the
sample tend to export more when their exchange rate depreciates more
that the currency of their main competitors in export markets. Given that
MENA countries tend to display a similar pattern of partners as NMS (at
least as long as manufacturing exports are concerned), and given that
NMS are their main competitors (with Asian countries for textile) on EU
markets, this means that MENA countries should feel and incentive, not
only to contain the volatility of the exchange rate against the euro, but
also to contain real appreciation, compared to their main competitors.
While the euro appears as a natural anchor to MENA countries, due
to the proximity of both areas, its desirability as a potential anchor would
not stem mainly from the impact of exchange rate volatility on trade, but
on other factors like the openness of MENA countries towards the EMU,
or the share of EMU countries in MENA capital inflows, or the need for a
cut in risk premia for MENA countries. MENA exports are less sensitive
to variations of exchange rate and to volatility than others developing
countries. Intra MENA trade intra-MENA seems to be little reactive to
changes in the real exchange rate due to the heterogeneity. Therefore, a
stabilization of their currency against the Euro may not translate in much
more trade. Thus, it could stabilize the price of their manufactured goods
which are more sensitive to chnages in prices in exports markets. If this
strategy is chosen, it could be quite difficult to avoid trade inbalances. To
stabilize their currencies agianst the Euro will probably be acompanied
with a real apreciation and their trade remains quite sensitive to the level
of real exchange rate.
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Table 2: Exchange rates and the volume of exports
Dependent Variable: Log of Exports
1980-2002 1992-2002 1998-2002
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intcpt -37.316a -38.077a -30.337a -30.771a -43.574a -42.317a
(1.639) (1.639) (4.038) (4.032) (13.752) (13.748)
lnGDPit 0.956a 0.970a 0.735a 0.744a 0.632c 0.609c
(0.043) (0.043) (0.111) (0.111) (0.355) (0.354)
lnGDPjt 0.977a 0.991a 0.938a 0.947a 1.511a 1.488a
(0.043) (0.043) (0.111) (0.111) (0.355) (0.355)
Contiguity -0.080b -0.074b 0.034 0.033 0.055 0.054
(0.034) (0.034) (0.042) (0.042) (0.059) (0.059)
Common Language 0.431a 0.420a 0.450a 0.450a 0.513a 0.513a
(0.023) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031) (0.044) (0.044)
Colony 0.410a 0.411a 0.281a 0.281a 0.273a 0.273a
(0.040) (0.040) (0.051) (0.051) (0.072) (0.072)
Common Colony 0.674a 0.655a 0.902a 0.902a 0.904a 0.903a
(0.049) (0.049) (0.065) (0.065) (0.091) (0.091)
Colony after 1945 0.428a 0.425a 0.499a 0.498a 0.427a 0.424a
(0.062) (0.062) (0.082) (0.082) (0.116) (0.116)
Same Country 0.574a 0.569a 0.485a 0.486a 0.306a 0.305a
(0.054) (0.054) (0.061) (0.061) (0.084) (0.084)
lnDISTij -0.955a -0.951a -1.001a -1.000a -0.990a -0.989a
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027)
lnRERijt 0.541a 0.539a 0.568a 0.568a 0.374a 0.374a
(0.022) (0.022) (0.040) (0.040) (0.111) (0.111)
NER vol. (σd lnNERijt ) -0.567
a -0.261 -0.171
(0.137) (0.226) (0.652)
RER vol. (σd lnRERijt ) -0.933
a -0.769b -0.762
(0.152) (0.343) (0.680)
N 34457 34273 20636 20636 9821 9821
R2 0.771 0.771 0.794 0.794 0.804 0.804
RMSE .977 .973 .945 .945 .91 .91
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c stand for statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels respectively.
Santos Silva J.M.C. and S. Tenreyro (2006) "The Log of Gravity",
Forthcoming in The Review of Economics and Statistics.
Tenreyro S. (2006) "On the Trade Impact of Nominal Exchange Rate
Volatility" Forthcoming in Journal of Development Economics.
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Table 3: Exchange rates and the volume of imports
Dependent Variable: Log of Imports
1980-2002 1992-2002 1998-2002
Model : (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
intcpt -36.303a -37.024a -29.253a -29.656a -39.618a -38.327a
(1.639) (1.640) (4.032) (4.026) (13.741) (13.738)
lnGDPit 1.011a 1.023a 0.962a 0.971a 0.631c 0.608c
(0.043) (0.043) (0.111) (0.111) (0.355) (0.355)
lnGDPjt 0.894a 0.909a 0.695a 0.702a 1.439a 1.416a
(0.043) (0.043) (0.111) (0.111) (0.354) (0.354)
Contiguity -0.087b -0.084b 0.037 0.036 0.052 0.052
(0.034) (0.034) (0.042) (0.042) (0.059) (0.059)
Common Language 0.431a 0.419a 0.446a 0.445a 0.509a 0.509a
(0.023) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031) (0.044) (0.044)
Colony 0.414a 0.422a 0.279a 0.280a 0.274a 0.274a
(0.040) (0.040) (0.051) (0.051) (0.072) (0.072)
Common Colony 0.678a 0.658a 0.910a 0.910a 0.904a 0.903a
(0.049) (0.049) (0.065) (0.065) (0.091) (0.091)
Colony after 1945 0.426a 0.418a 0.503a 0.501a 0.429a 0.427a
(0.062) (0.062) (0.082) (0.082) (0.116) (0.116)
Same Country 0.574a 0.568a 0.483a 0.484a 0.307a 0.306a
(0.054) (0.054) (0.061) (0.061) (0.084) (0.084)
lnDISTij -0.961a -0.957a -1.002a -1.001a -0.990a -0.989a
(0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.027) (0.027)
lnRERijt 0.195a 0.192a 0.185a 0.186a -0.112 -0.112
(0.022) (0.022) (0.040) (0.040) (0.111) (0.111)
NER vol. (σd lnNERijt ) -0.554
a -0.228 0.087
(0.138) (0.226) (0.652)
RER vol. (σd lnRERijt ) -0.898
a -0.781b -0.504
(0.152) (0.342) (0.680)
N 34458 34274 20638 20638 9821 9821
R2 0.8 0.8 0.823 0.823 0.835 0.835
RMSE .978 .974 .943 .943 .91 .91
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c stand for statistical significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 4: Do MENA countries behave differently from all the countries of the
sample? Exports
Dep. Variable: Log of Exports
Model : (1) (2) (3)
1980-2002 1992-2002 1998-2002
intcpt -36.117a -30.395a -41.875a
(1.646) (4.038) (13.774)
lnGDPit 0.902a 0.736a 0.555
(0.044) (0.111) (0.356)
lnGDPjt 0.983a 0.939a 1.522a
(0.043) (0.111) (0.355)
Contiguity -0.075b 0.035 0.055
(0.034) (0.042) (0.059)
Common Language 0.438a 0.452a 0.512a
(0.023) (0.031) (0.044)
Colony 0.397a 0.275a 0.274a
(0.040) (0.051) (0.072)
Common Colony 0.690a 0.912a 0.898a
(0.049) (0.065) (0.091)
Colony after 1945 0.435a 0.504a 0.426a
(0.062) (0.082) (0.116)
Same Country 0.573a 0.483a 0.308a
(0.054) (0.061) (0.084)
lnDISTij -0.952a -1.000a -0.989a
(0.015) (0.019) (0.027)
MENAi × lnRERijt 0.220a 0.346a 0.156
(0.046) (0.108) (0.287)
(1−MENAi)× lnRERijt 0.626a 0.598a 0.397a
(0.024) (0.041) (0.118)
MENAi × V OLijt 0.557 1.318b -2.450c
(0.349) (0.603) (1.285)
(1−MENAi)× V OLijt -0.760a -0.497b 0.431
(0.146) (0.239) (0.714)
N 34457 20636 9821
R2 0.771 0.794 0.804
RMSE .976 .944 .91
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c stand for statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
19
Table 5: Do MENA countries behave differently from all the countries of the
sample? Imports
Dep. Variable: Log of Imports
Model : (1) (2) (3)
1980-2002 1992-2002 1998-2002
intcpt -36.496a -30.546a -39.598a
(1.545) (4.030) (13.122)
lnGDPit 1.014a 0.962a 0.635c
(0.043) (0.111) (0.355)
lnGDPjt 0.876a 0.708a 1.387a
(0.044) (0.111) (0.356)
Contiguity -0.087b 0.035 0.053
(0.034) (0.042) (0.059)
Common Language 0.434a 0.445a 0.509a
(0.023) (0.031) (0.044)
Colony 0.410a 0.280a 0.272a
(0.040) (0.051) (0.072)
Common Colony 0.684a 0.907a 0.910a
(0.049) (0.065) (0.091)
Colony after 1945 0.429a 0.504a 0.432a
(0.062) (0.082) (0.116)
Same Country 0.576a 0.482a 0.309a
(0.054) (0.061) (0.084)
lnDISTij -0.960a -1.003a -0.990a
(0.015) (0.019) (0.027)
MENAj × lnRERijt 0.296a -0.082 0.468c
(0.045) (0.105) (0.285)
(1−MENAj)× lnRERijt 0.166a 0.215a -0.199c
(0.024) (0.041) (0.118)
MENAj × V OLijt 0.015 1.363b -0.881
(0.349) (0.599) (1.283)
(1−MENAj)× V OLijt -0.648a -0.443c 0.362
(0.146) (0.239) (0.713)
N 34458 20638 9821
R2 0.766 0.79 0.805
RMSE .978 .943 .909
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c stand for statistical signi-
ficance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 6: Heterogeneity of estimates across developing countries of the sample.
Exports
Dep. Variable: Log of Exports
Model : (1) (2) (3)
1980-2002 1992-2002 1998-2002
intcpt -35.798a -34.315a -40.720a
(1.660) (4.056) (13.787)
lnGDPit 0.890a 0.888a 0.516
(0.044) (0.112) (0.357)
lnGDPjt 0.983a 0.938a 1.518a
(0.043) (0.111) (0.355)
Contiguity -0.078b 0.032 0.055
(0.034) (0.042) (0.059)
Common Language 0.438a 0.452a 0.511a
(0.023) (0.031) (0.044)
Colony 0.397a 0.273a 0.273a
(0.040) (0.051) (0.072)
Common Colony 0.698a 0.912a 0.895a
(0.049) (0.065) (0.091)
Colony after 1945 0.440a 0.517a 0.429a
(0.062) (0.082) (0.116)
Same Country 0.580a 0.517a 0.311a
(0.054) (0.061) (0.084)
lnDISTij -0.953a -0.997a -0.989a
(0.015) (0.019) (0.027)
lnRERijt 0.599a 0.701a 0.487a
(0.032) (0.060) (0.176)
Vol. NER (σd lnNERijt) -0.581
b -0.523 0.319
(0.231) (0.416) (1.123)
MENAi × lnRERijt -0.378a -0.340a -0.299
(0.055) (0.120) (0.332)
NMSi × lnRERijt -0.152b -0.584a -0.807a
(0.066) (0.093) (0.297)
ASIAi × lnRERijt 0.152a 0.350a 0.194
(0.048) (0.095) (0.276)
MENAi × V OLijt 1.142a 1.838b -2.831c
(0.408) (0.718) (1.623)
NMSi × V OLijt -0.175 0.270 -2.412
(0.306) (0.516) (1.640)
ASIAi × V OLijt -0.272 -0.740 0.128
(0.394) (0.623) (1.395)
N 34457 20636 9821
R2 0.771 0.795 0.804
RMSE .976 .943 .91
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c stand for statistical signi-
ficance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 7: Heterogeneity of estimates across developing countries of the sample
Dep. Variable: Log of Imports
Model : (1) (2) (3)
1980-2002 1992-2002 1998-2002
intcpt -37.771a -30.980a -40.539a
(1.559) (4.048) (13.120)
lnGDPit 1.026a 0.962a 0.640c
(0.043) (0.111) (0.354)
lnGDPjt 0.915a 0.728a 1.419a
(0.044) (0.112) (0.357)
Contiguity -0.081b 0.037 0.055
(0.034) (0.042) (0.059)
Common Language 0.433a 0.444a 0.503a
(0.023) (0.031) (0.044)
Colony 0.411a 0.282a 0.272a
(0.040) (0.051) (0.072)
Common Colony 0.674a 0.903a 0.931a
(0.049) (0.065) (0.091)
Colony after 1945 0.420a 0.487a 0.425a
(0.062) (0.082) (0.116)
Same Country 0.571a 0.486a 0.331a
(0.054) (0.061) (0.084)
lnDISTij -0.957a -1.002a -0.984a
(0.015) (0.019) (0.027)
lnRERijt 0.068b -0.072 -0.382b
(0.032) (0.061) (0.176)
MENAj × lnRERijt 0.227a -0.019 0.854a
(0.054) (0.117) (0.329)
NMSj × lnRERijt 0.145b 0.469a 0.073
(0.067) (0.093) (0.298)
ASIAj × lnRERijt 0.274a 0.637a 0.690b
(0.049) (0.095) (0.276)
NER vol. (σd lnNERijt) -1.327
a -1.074b -2.610b
(0.231) (0.417) (1.121)
MENAj × V OLijt 1.315a 2.448a 1.732
(0.407) (0.715) (1.618)
NMSj × V OLijt 1.108a 0.807 7.958a
(0.307) (0.516) (1.635)
ASIAj × V OLijt 1.354a 2.192a 4.411a
(0.389) (0.623) (1.393)
N 34458 20638 9821
R2 0.766 0.791 0.805
RMSE .977 .942 .908
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c stand for statistical signi-
ficance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 8: Is Intra-Mena trade specific? Exports
Dep. Variable: Log of Exports













Common Colony 0.678* 0.682*
(0.049) (0.049)
Colony after 1945 0.429* 0.412*
(0.062) (0.062)






MENAij × lnRERijt -0.368* -0.375*
(0.102) (0.101)
MENA/UEM × lnRERijt -0.538*
(0.054)
NER vol (σd lnNERijt) -0.558* -0.558*
(0.141) (0.140)
MENAij × V OLijt 0.575 0.450
(1.095) (1.094)
MENA/UEM × V OLijt -0.248
(0.662)
MENAi/UEMj × lnRERijt -1.093*
(0.076)
MENAj/UEMi × lnRERijt -0.018
(0.075)
MENAi/UEMj × V OLijt 1.542
(0.961)





Note: Standard errors in parentheses: ∗ , stand for statistical significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 9: Is Intra-Mena trade specific?
Dep. Variable: Log of Imports













Common Colony 0.682* 0.687*
(0.049) (0.049)
Colony after 1945 0.424* 0.404*
(0.062) (0.062)






MENAij × lnRERijt 0.125 0.130
(0.102) (0.102)
MENA/UEM × lnRERijt -0.480*
(0.054)
NER vol. (σd lnNERijt) -0.524* -0.525*
(0.141) (0.141)
MENAij × V Olijt 0.280 0.134
(1.096) (1.094)
MENA/UEM × V OLijt -0.968
(0.663)
MENAi/UEMj × lnRERijt -1.110*
(0.076)
MENAj/UEMi × lnRERijt 0.131
(0.076)
MENAi/UEMj × V OLijt 0.477
(0.896)





Note: Standard errors in parentheses: a, b and c stand for statistical signi-
ficance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Table 10: Data description
variable name variable label Source
t Year




Xival Exports from i to j, value, Nci mns. CHELEM




Mjval Imports of j from i, current value, mns. CHELEM
GDP_i GDP, PPP (constant 1995 international $) WDI WB
GDP_j GDP, PPP (constant 1995 international $), WDI WB
nertij Bilateral monthly nominal exchange rate, source
IMF, International Financial Statistics, line rf.
IMF, line rf
rer_ppp_ij PPI deflated bilateral real exchange rate IMF, line rf and 63 + na-
tional sources
rert_cpi_ij CPI deflated bilateral real exchange rate IMF, line rf and 64 + na-
tional sources
sd_rer Standard-deviation of monthly real exchange rate in
year t
Authors calculations
sd_ner Standard-deviation of monthly nominal exchange
rate in year t
Authors calculations
mean_rer Mean of monthly real exchange rate in year t Authors calculations
mean_ner Mean of monthly nominal exchange rate in year t Authors calculations
vol_rer Real exchange rate monthly volatility Authors calculations
vol_ner Nominal exchange rate monthly volatility Authors calculations
sd_growth_rer Standard deviation of monthly real exchange rate
changes in year t
Authors calculations
sd_growth_ner Standard deviation of monthly nominal exchange
rate changes in year t
Authors calculations
dist simple distance (most populated cities, km) CEPII online database
distcap simple distance between capitals (capitals, km) CEPII online database
distw weighted distance (pop-wt, km) CEPII online database








contig 1 for contiguity CEPII online database
comlang_off 1 for common official of primary language CEPII online database
comlang_ethno 1 if a language is spoken by at least 9% of the pop-
ulation in both countries
CEPII online database
colony 1 for pairs ever in colonial relationship CEPII online database
comcol 1 for common colonizer post 1945 CEPII online database
curcol 1 for pairs currently in colonial relationship CEPII online database
col45 1 for pairs in colonial relationship post 1945 CEPII online database
smctry 1 if countries were or are the same country CEPII online database
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